Welcome to Heterodox Academy - Heterodox Academy

Why is HxA Necessary?

In order to address society’s most intractable problems, learners must weave together the best ideas from a range of perspectives.

In many fields, scholars’ backgrounds and commitments are insufficiently diverse. As a result, important questions and ideas may go unexplored, key assumptions can go unchallenged, and the natural human tendencies towards motivated reasoning, confirmation bias, and tribalism can go unchecked. This undermines research quality and the impartiality of peer review; it can also corrupt committee decisions about admissions, hiring, promotion, and curriculum design. Simultaneously, institutional policies, procedures and incentive models of colleges and universities are changing. The needs, priorities and expectations among new cohorts of students are evolving — even as the political climate in the United States (and beyond) has grown increasingly polarized and toxic. The result is a highly-combustible campus environment. Professors and students alike describe the toll self-censoring and the ever-present threat of social or bureaucratic censure have taken on learning, discovery, and growth.

These problems have not gone unnoticed by lawmakers, the media, or the general public. Many fields and institutions where these trends are most pronounced have faced declining enrollments and budget cuts. Meanwhile, trust in universities, expertise, and scientific research has eroded — reducing the impact and continued viability of many lines of inquiry.

What Does HxA Do?

As a collaborative of academic insiders, we are deeply committed to the continued flourishing of colleges and universities — and deeply concerned about the current state of affairs, which is not sustainable. We aspire to help chart a different path forward by:

Increasing public awareness of these issues, to spur action among faculty, staff, students, alumni and donors;
Conducting, disseminating and facilitating research to better understand the nature of the challenges facing institutions of higher learning — and how they can be effectively addressed;
Developing tools and resources that professors, administrators, and others can deploy to assess and then improve their own pedagogical, disciplinary and broader campus cultures;
Cultivating communities of practice among teachers, researchers, and administrators to help accelerate the process of reform; and
Identifying and celebrating institutions that make progress on these matters.

Key Tools & Resources:

A self-report tool you can use to assess which students are feeling intimidated to speak up about which topics and why.

An interactive, psychology-based platform designed to depolarize campuses and foster mutual understanding across differences.

LATEST BLOG POSTS

frontpage

- The Perception Gap: How False Impressions are Pulling Americans Apart
  Over the past 25 years the partisanship of the American electorate has increased (see e.g., here, here, and here), and concern about how this increased partisanship may impact American democracy is now prevalent (see e.g., here, here, and here). However, new research by More in Common suggests that Americans are more similar to their political opponents than they realize. These new findings are also consistent with previous research by More in Common which found that very few Americans are staunch ideologies (most, they argued, comprise an ‘exhausted majority’ who hold moderate and heterodox views and are frustrated with how extremes seem to dominate our politics and civic life). The main findings of their new study, “The Perception Gap,” are also consistent with over three-decades of research. Here, we will briefly present their core findings and connect them to the existing scholarly literature. Key Findings Some of the big takeaways from the ‘perception gap’ report Include: Democrats and Republicans significantly overestimate how many people on the ‘other side’ hold extreme views. Typically, their estimates are roughly double the actual numbers for a given issue. Greater partisanship is associated with holding more exaggerated views of one’s political opponents. The Perception Gap is strongest on both “Wings” (America’s more politically partisan groups). Consumption of most forms of media, including talk radio, newspapers, social media, and local news, is associated with a wider Perception Gap. Education seems to increase, rather than mitigate, the Perception Gap (just as increased education has found to track with increased ideological prejudice). College education results in an especially distorted view of Republicans among liberals in particular. The wider people’s Perception Gap, the more likely they are to attribute negative personal qualities (like ‘hateful’ or ‘brainwashed’) to their political opponents. In other words, these data suggest that Americans know what positions the different political parties typically hold and disagree on (e.g., pro-choice or pro-life; for more government regulation of the economy or for less government regulation of the economy), but they exaggerate the difference between themselves and the constituents of rival parties. The more partisan they are, the more they exaggerate partisan differences (Figure 1). Figure 1. Perception Gap by political tribe (for definitions of each tribe see here). As can be seen in the table below which documents over two decades of peer-reviewed scholarship, the exaggeration of differences between rival political groups reported by More in Common should not be surprising — nor their finding that greater partisanship increases the exaggeration of these perceived differences — nor their finding that increased information or reflectiveness fails to ameliorate the perception gap. Overall conclusions about the ‘perception gap’ and its implications follow this brief literature review: Publication Sample Characteristics Key Findings Judd & Johnson (1981) 54 undergraduate females enrolled at Radcliffe College: 28 feminists and 26 non-feminists. “For prevalence estimates of population groups with whom the subject has little direct contact, extreme subjects tend to overestimate the prevalence of extreme positions relative to less extreme subjects. This overestimation is as true for estimates of the disagreeable or anti position as it is for the agreeable or pro position” (p. 33).“Subjects with intense affect towards an issue view the world as polarized on that issue” (p. 34). “Subjects with intense affect towards an issue view positions on that issue as relatively more diagnostic of other personality traits and characteristics. This is true even though they view both pro- and anti-attitudes on that issue as prevalent” (p. 34). Robinson et al. (1995) Study 1a: 27 pro-choice activists and 25 pro-life activists.Study 1b: 66 undergraduates enrolled in an introductory psychology course.Study 2: 59 Stanford undergraduates enrolled in introductory psychology courses or recruited from dormitories; 23 liberals, 20 conservatives, and 16 moderates. “… partisans involved in socio-political conflicts tend to overestimate the extremity and ideological congruency of the underlying beliefs and construal of the other side, and often of their own side as well” (p. 414).“Another noteworthy, perhaps surprising, feature in our data may be the tendency for those holding the conservative position on the relevant issue to be perceived less accurately than those holding the liberal position, a tendency shared by liberals, by neutrals, and by conservatives themselves” (p. 414). Sherman et al. (2003) Study 1: 78 undergraduates from the dormitories of Stanford University; 58 supported the affirmative action proposal and 14 opposed the proposal. Study 2: 53 undergraduates enrolled in an introductory psychology course at Stanford University; 32 supported the affirmative action proposal, 10 were neutral, and 11 opposed the proposal. Study 3: 58 undergraduates enrolled in introductory psychology courses (32 from Princeton University and 26 from Stanford University); 43 supported the affirmative action proposal and 15 opposed the proposal. “Closer examination of Figure 1 reveals that students favoring rejection of the affirmative action proposal were misperceived to a greater extent by allies and opponents alike” (p. 279).“Thus, the prediction of a false-polarization effect was clearly confirmed, with both the partisans and nonpartisans assuming the existence of a wide ideological chasm, where little if any existed” (p. 281).“The fact that in actuality, supporters and rejecters of the affirmative action proposal differed little if at all on ideology and beliefs about other issues, suggests that the assumptions made by participants may have led them astray” (p. 282). Chambers & Melnyk (2006) Study 1: 447 undergraduates enrolled in a psychology course at the University of Florida; 246 had strong pro-choice views and 201 had strong pro-life views.Study 2: 480 undergraduates enrolled in an introductory psychology course at the University of Florida; 245 Democrats and 235 Republicans. “… the key finding to emerge from the present research was that these (mis)perceptions of disagreement were linked to the specific impressions partisans had of their rivals. In particular, to the extent partisans believed their rivals were opposed to their own core values, they attributed negative traits to members of the rival group, positive traits to members of their own group, saw themselves as less similar to the outgroup, expressed anger toward the outgroup, and exhibited an ingroup bias in favor of their ingroup” (p. 1307). Chambers et al. (2006) Study 1: 199 undergraduates enrolled in an elementary psychology course at the University of Iowa; 125 were strongly pro-choice and 74 were strongly pro-life. Study 2: 88 undergraduates enrolled in an elementary psychology course at the University of Iowa; 29 Democrats, 28 Republicans, and 30 neutral or unaffiliated. “Our research suggests that partisans perceive greater disagreement regarding the value issues they see as central to their own position than regarding less central value issues. The partisans in our studies were more alike in their opinions than they knew, and this fact was lost on them because, in their minds, the conflict was not about their adversaries’ central values but their own. Ironically, this led to a situation in which partisans disagreed about what they disagreed about. Each side saw the other as irrationally and stubbornly challenging the very foundation of their personal ideologies, while seeing consensus of opinion about their adversaries’ core values” (p. 43). Graham et al. (2012) 2,212 U.S residents or citizens who visited ProjectImplicit.org: 1,174 liberals, 500 conservatives, and 538 moderates. “The results also confirm previous studies of misperception by showing that, in general, people overestimate how dramatically liberals and conservatives differ” (p. 8).“We presented three competing hypotheses about accuracy: 1) We found some support for the hypothesis that moderates would be most accurate, which they were in the case of the binding foundations. However, and most critically, partisan inaccuracies were not mirror images of each other. On the contrary, liberals and conservatives both tended to exaggerate their binding foundation differences by underestimating the typical liberal and overestimating the typical conservative. 2) We found no support for the hypothesis that liberals would be the most accurate; liberals were the least accurate about conservatives and about liberals. The largest inaccuracies were liberals’ underestimations of conservatives’ Harm and Fairness concerns, and liberals further exaggerated the political differences by overestimating their own such concerns. 3) Finally, we found some support for the hypothesis that conservatives would be the most accurate, which they were in the case of the individualizing foundations. In line with Moral Foundations Theory, liberals dramatically underestimated the Harm and Fairness concerns of conservatives” (p. 9-10). Van Boven et al (2012) Study 1: Nationally representative sample of 1,000 Americans collected in conjunction with the 2008 ANES. Study 2: Online survey of 129 U.S. adults recruited from classified advertisements in Atlanta, Denver, Los Angeles, and New York. Study 3: 28 undergraduates participated for course credit at the University of Colorado, Boulder. Study 4: 101 undergraduates participated for course credit at the University of Colorado, Boulder. “These results demonstrate —for the first time, and with a nationally representative sample — the simultaneous occurrence of polarization projection and simple projection. In the partisan context of a presidential election, people who were more extreme in their own support for one presidential candidate over the other perceived Americans as more polarized compared with people who were moderate in their support for the candidates” (p. 90).“Polarization projection and simple projection were also independent of people’s partisan identification. To be sure, people who more strongly identified as a Democrat or Republican perceived more polarization than did people who identified less strongly. But the effects of polarization projection and simple projection were independent of political identification” (p. 90). “Together, then, these findings indicate that people project onto others perceptions of the processes underlying their own attitudes toward a partisan topic. This process projection occurred even as people perceive others as engaging in less rational, more biased processing than themselves” (p. 91). “These results conceptually replicate the central findings of Studies 1 and 2, but in a more tightly controlled laboratory setting, with naturally occurring partisan groups and with a novel issue. Participants were confronted with a fictional partisan issue regarding the allocation of resources to naturally occurring groups of resident and nonresident students at a large public university. The more polarized their attitudes, the more they perceived polarization in the distribution of attitudes among other students, independent of simple projection” (p. 94).“These results indicate that introspection about the processes underlying one’s partisan attitudes increased both polarization projection and simple projection. Introspection increased the relationship between people’s own attitude extremity and their perception of polarized attitudes among others (polarization projection)” (p. 96).“We found evidence for a psychological phenomenon of polarization projection. People project the extremity of their own partisan attitudes onto others such that those with more extreme attitudes perceive greater polarization than do those with less extreme attitudes” (p. 96). Scherer et al. (2015) Study 1: 204 U.S. residents recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform; 72 Democrats, 46 Republicans, 86 Independents/other party. Study 2: 219 U.S residents recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform “… the perceived differences between Republicans and Democrats on these trait measures were significantly larger than the actual differences” (p. 206). “… these stereotypes seemed to be driven by an overestimation of the extent to which Republicans possess traits linked to epistemic, existential, and ideological motives. While Democrats seem to have especially exaggerated perceptions of Republicans, there was also evidence that partisans from both ends of the spectrum exhibited greater stereotype exaggeration” (p. 207-208). Westfall et al. (2015) More than 20,000 responses to the ANES, conducted from 1968 to 2008. “We found that people perceive greater polarization when partisans are categorized and people estimate the attitudes of the opposing group relative to their own group; when people strongly identify with their partisan group, whether Democrat or Republican; and when people hold relatively extreme partisan attitudes. These last two factors interacted such that people high in issue partisanship — that is, people whose attitudes correspond with their partisan identity—perceived the greatest levels of political attitude polarization” (p. 155).“… our results have at least two direct implications for contemporary political discourse. First, nearly all of the effects reported here are symmetrical for Democrats and Republicans. The tendency to overestimate polarization, the association between perceived polarization and political actions, and the factors associated with perceived polarization are true of both Democrats and Republicans” (p. 155).“Second, among the more striking findings from our analysis is that those who perceive the greatest political attitude polarization in the United States — and, hence, those who most exaggerate political polarization — are those who are themselves most polarized, strongly identifying as party members and holding relatively extreme attitudes that align with their partisan identities” (p. 155). Bordalo et al. (2016) Dataset 1: Graham et al. (2012): 1,174 liberals and 500 conservatives (referred to as the GNH data).Dataset 2: More than 20,000 responses to the ANES, conducted from 1964 to 2012. “In the full data sets, we treat each (issue, year) pair as an observation, and we cluster standard errors at the issue level. For the GNH data, we have 45 observations: 45 issues measured in the same year. For the ANES data, we have 66 observations: 10 issues, measured in multiple years… Figure IV shows that the believed difference between typical conservative and typical liberal positions is larger than the true difference in mean positions for 109 of the 111 observations. The data for both GNH (squares) and ANES (triangles) lies above the 45-degree line (dashed)” (p. 1785-1787). “The systematic and significant exaggeration of mean differences suggests that the benchmark model of accurate beliefs is missing something important. Indeed, this exaggeration reflects the fact that believed means are typically more extreme than true means” (p. 1787). Levendusky & Malhotra (2016) Nationally representative probability sample of 510 U.S. adults, collected by GfK Custom Research. “… the perceived divide between Republicans and Democrats on every issue is larger than the actual divide between Republicans and Democrats” (p. 384).“Figure 1 shows that even though people view members of their own party as more extreme than they actually are, they view opposing partisans as even more extreme (see also table 1)” (p. 386).“Hence, false polarization is caused by people perceiving both their own party and the opposing party to be more extreme than they are in reality, but their perceptions of the extremity of opposing partisans are even more skewed” (p. 388). Lammers et al. (2017) Study 1: 114 Americans recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.Study 2: 202 Americans recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.Study 3: 300 Americans recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.Study 4: 300 Americans recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.Study 5: 300 Americans recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.Study 6: 300 Americans recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Study 7: 483 Americans recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.Study 8: 302 Americans recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.Meta-analysis: Performed on all 8 studies and on 2 additional studies that did not show the expected effect. “People on both political extremes categorize stimuli in the political domain more strongly than do moderates. They are more likely to cluster similar political stimuli closer together and form tighter, more homogenous categories. This applies to a wide range of political stimuli, such as politicians (Study 1), groups associated with different ideologies (Study 2), or newspapers (Study 3), and also applies to the inferences that people make about politics — for example, how people vote across the country (Study 4) and whether politically different people share personal tastes (Study 5) or social relationships (Study 6-8)” (p. 618-619).“The current work extends beyond existing work by its basic nature. Earlier research shows that people on the political extremes exaggerate differences across the political divide, see greater polarization, in their opponents’ attitudes, and are more dogmatic. The current findings fit with that literature but go beyond it by showing that people with strong political opinions not only have more extreme views but even represent the political domain differently. They categorize the same stimuli differently and perceive more homogenous and separate categories than do moderates and neutrals” (p. 619). “When differences between political groups or stimuli are large and real, drawing sharper political clusters and categories can increase the efficient use of cognitive resources, allowing people on the political extremes to draw inferences more quickly than the politically moderate. On the other hand, it may lead people to exaggerate differences between categories and thus introduce oversimplified and erroneous thinking about a complex and multifaceted word. This explains why liberals and conservatives in the United States find it so difficult to connect. People on the political extremes may not only miss opportunities to connect across the partisan divide because of negative emotions or lack of motivation but also because in their perception of political reality there simply is no middle ground” (p. 619). Van Boven et al. (2018) Sample 1: 1,056 Americans recruited through Qualtrics’ national panel.Sample 2: 1,065 Americans recruited through ROI Rocket’s proprietary “general population” market research panel. “As much as people are personally swayed by partisanship, they expect partisan influence to be even stronger among other Democrats and Republicans. People generally exaggerate partisan opposition, thereby overestimating political polarization between Democrats and Republicans. Whereas people see their own stances as grounded in careful, dispassionate, and nonideological analysis, they see others’ stances as blatantly partisan, often reflecting careless, ideological thinking. In other words, people exaggerate how much partisans reactively devalue the opposing side’s ideas” (p. 500).“Respondents slightly exaggerated how much their fellow Democrats and Republicans would support policies from their own political party … To a much larger degree, respondents exaggerated reactive devaluation by partisans on the other side. Respondents substantially underestimated Republicans’ support for Democratic policies … and Democrats’ support for Republican policies … Thus, even though Democrats and Republicans were themselves swayed by partisan framing, they exaggerated how much the degree to which partisan framing would influence others’ policy support” (p. 500).“People support the same policies when proposed by their own party more strongly than when proposed by the other party, and people exaggerate how much other Democrats and Republicans are swayed by partisanship, which creates potent, but false, norms of partisan opposition” (p. 503). Conclusions The findings reported by More in Common should be treated as an additional data point for the table above. All studies have flaws and all of the studies listed here can be criticized to some degree. Some have small sample sizes and/or non-representative samples. Others, that made an effort to obtain representative probability samples, can be critiqued on how the questions are worded. Thus, on the one hand it is not surprising that More in Common’s conclusions have already been criticized. Critique of methodology and statistical analysis is always welcome, they are one of the primary driving forces of scientific investigation. On the other hand, however, the findings reported by More in Common are remarkably similar to each of the studies documented above. Furthermore, the studies documented in Table 1 run the gamut from small unrepresentative samples, to larger unrepresentative samples, to nationally representative probability samples, and finally to cross-sectional analyses of the American National Election Study. That so many different samples yield similar results, lends a good deal of support to the conclusions that More in Common reached. The political Perception Gap appears to be very real. Ignoring or dismissing this fact is not going to reduce it. In fact, as suggested by Chambers & Melnyk (2006) and Chambers et al. (2006), it may exacerbate it. Thus, a more salient question may be, “what can be done about it?” given that many of the most intuitively obvious correctives — education, the media (including from flagship publications like the New York Times, Washington Post et al.) and political engagement — all seem to make the problem worse. Social media may also contribute to the perception gap by pressuring people to publicly conform to the expected position of their tribe despite the reality that they may hold much more nuanced, even heretical, views (which are often revealed in more private settings); the More in Common study finds that increased sharing of political content on social media correlates with a higher partisan perception gap. It may be possible to ‘fix’ higher ed and media institutions so that they become part of the solution instead. This is, for instance, what Heterodox Academy hopes to do with respect to institutions of higher learning (and organizations like Solutions Journalism aspire to do for the media). However, a number of organizations and movements nationwide have also emerged to help people with different commitments, and from different walks of life, engage with one another directly (e.g. The Village Square, Better Angels, Bridge USA, Free Intelligent Conversations — more here). Although these latter efforts have often proven challenging to scale, they offer a means for citizens to sidestep the institutions currently mediating (and often undermining) our engagement with one-another. It seems plausible that a ‘both/ and’ approach may be most effective here, although more applied research on how to effectively mitigate partisan perception gaps would be helpful. Citation: Daniel Yudkin et al. (2019). “The Perception Gap: How False Impressions are Pulling Americans Apart.” More in Common, June. Sean Stevens is Heterodox Academy’s Research Director. He has a PhD in social psychology from Rutgers University. As an organization that prizes pluralism and disagreement — with more than 2,500 members holding diverse views on most issues — Heterodox Academy almost never takes positions as an organization on current events and controversies. Opinions expressed here are those of the author(s). Publication does not imply endorsement by Heterodox Academy or any of its members. We encourage readers to follow us on Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn — and to join in the conversation on those forums — to weigh in on this or other posts.... Read more...
- On South Dakota’s HB 1087 and Legislating Viewpoint Diversity
  Note: A PDF of the letter submitted to the South Dakota Board of Regents can be downloaded here. The South Dakota Board of Regents has solicited public comment on how to fulfill the intent of the new legislative requirement, recently passed in South Dakota, to promote free speech and intellectual diversity at public colleges and universities. Specifically, the Board of Regents requested recommendations on how “to develop (a) some baseline assessment on the degree to which South Dakota Regental institutions are or are not meeting that definition and objective today, (b) suggestions on how to do so more effectively (to the extent a shortcoming is defined), and (c) some legitimate and measurable metrics to help define progress in the future.” We write to provide detailed suggestions to achieve these goals, even though we disagree with the spirit of HB 1087 and the reporting requirements it intends to establish. We explain our disagreements below, then offer suggestions for measuring viewpoint diversity on campuses while also maintaining a high degree of university autonomy with regards to legislative oversight. Summary We have no doubt that open inquiry in higher education is currently threatened on several fronts. Faculty have abandoned pursuit of research on politically controversial topics; people from across the political spectra have launched campaigns calling for scholars to be terminated from their positions because their work challenges a preferred narrative; and, many colleges have expanded administrative oversight and are actively encouraging people to resolve disputes through reporting, investigations, and academic reprisals rather than good-faith debate and discussion. Many fields of study and educational institutions in the United States seem to lack sufficient viewpoint diversity. This is true both with respect to political, religious, and other ideological affiliations, and also vis-a-vis different geographical, socioeconomic, and racial/ethnic backgrounds. Many fields and departments also lack gender diversity. Heterodox Academy (HxA) is a non-profit, non-partisan organization that is deeply concerned about the ways an absence of viewpoint diversity and intellectual or expressive freedom can undermine research and teaching. Its membership is comprised of thousands of faculty, administrators, and graduate students committed to promoting open inquiry, viewpoint diversity and constructive disagreement within institutions of higher learning. Most of the signatories are members of HxA’s core team and are deeply immersed in research on these issues. We speak only for ourselves, not the other members of the organization or the organization more broadly. We appreciate the concerns which seemed to motivate this legislation. Nevertheless, we are apprehensive about how HB 1087 is written, and how it may be implemented. Concerns About HB 1087 We strongly recommend to the South Dakota Board of Regents that university autonomy be maintained as much as possible when implementing HB 1087 for South Dakota’s 12 public colleges and universities. Every institution of higher learning has a unique history, internal dynamics, and external relationships — much like the communities in which they are embedded. They may have different missions, serve different constituencies, have different areas of excellence, and face different challenges. Given this diversity, top-down or one-size-fits-all approaches are typically ill-advised. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court routinely, gives deference to school officials to balance free speech considerations against the need to promote educational objectives and student safety.[1] This is because “judges [or legislators] lack the on-the-ground expertise and experience of school administrators” required to make such decisions.[2] University faculty and administrators have unique training and expertise, putting them in the best position to determine how to promote the expressive freedom and intellectual diversity in harmony with their other institutional needs, responsibilities, and functions. Any legislation that takes this judgment away from intellectual communities threatens the ability of those communities to maintain order and advance pedagogical aims. The expansion of administrative oversight occurring at many universities is already concerning; adding an additional layer of legislative oversight seems spurious and would likely prove counterproductive. Yet, although we disagree with the approach represented by HB 1087, it is the law in the state of South Dakota and will be implemented. Therefore, we would like to offer suggestions for how to effectively measure intellectual diversity on a given campus. Measuring Intellectual Climate on Campus Intellectual diversity (or viewpoint diversity) occurs when members of a community approach problems and questions from a range of perspectives. An open expressive climate exists when members of a community, regardless of their beliefs, perspectives, or other prior commitments, feel equally able to ask questions, share ideas, and otherwise participate in learning and knowledge production without risk of censure. While intellectual diversity and an open expressive climate are distinct issues, they are also interrelated and best pursued in tandem. After all, absent a diversity of perspectives and priorities — and the contention or disagreement that arises therefrom — protections for freedom of speech, assembly, association, etc. are largely unnecessary (although the climate is still problematic). Conversely, in the absence of an open, expressive climate, differences in backgrounds, commitments or perspectives tend to be buried rather than utilized in the service of knowledge production. That is, diversity and openness are mutually required for either to have value or substance. Yet while these Ingredients are necessary for a healthy and dynamic intellectual community, they are also insufficient. After all, viewpoint diversity and openness are perfectly consistent with an environment where people are talking past one-another, or at one-another. Yet effectively producing and disseminating knowledge requires instead that we speak with one-another, and work collaboratively and iteratively to understand and address difficult problems. This requires institutional norms and culture based on mutual respect — and a commitment to constructive disagreement. These cultural components cannot be effectively legislated or imposed, but they can be measured. An effective assessment of a campuses’ intellectual climate would, therefore, require an evaluation of: Whether or not a school’s policies protect or undermine free expressionHow diverse the intellectual community is, and How free students and faculty from different groups feel to share their views or express disagreement. The Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE) attempts to systematically track and evaluate schools on the basis of their formal policies towards free expression (corresponding to the first essential component above). Heterodox Academy has developed the Campus Expression Survey to help assess the other critical dimensions of a college or university’s intellectual climate. The Campus Expression Survey Heterodox Academy has developed the Campus Expression Survey (CES) to assess how students perceive the expression climate on their campus and in the classroom. Provided to any instructor or administrator free of charge, the CES consists of a Core Module, the Experience on Campus Module, and the Viewpoint Diversity Module. In the Core Module, students complete a baseline assessment asking if they are comfortable or reluctant expressing their views on a non-controversial topic. They are also asked if they are comfortable or reluctant expressing their views on controversial topics such as gender, politics, race, religion, and sexuality. Students respond to the following item, which is repeated for each controversial arena: “Think about being at your school in a class that was discussing a controversial issue about RACE. How comfortable or reluctant would you feel speaking up and giving your views on this topic.” Four answer options are offered: I would be very comfortable giving my views.I would be somewhat comfortable giving my views.I would be somewhat reluctant giving my views.I would very reluctant giving my views. Students who report any reluctance expressing their views are then asked how concerned they are about a series of potential consequences of expressing their views. These include concerns about how the professor would react, how other students would react, being criticized on social media, and being accused of harassment or violating a campus code of conduct. This module provides universities with a way to measure how free students from different groups personally feel to share their views or express disagreement. The Core Module of the CES provides faculty and administrators with a direct and fine-grained measure of who self-censors their views within the classroom, which controversial topics they self-censor their views on, and why they engage in self-censorship. Additionally, the items of the Core Module are easily modified by faculty and administrators, thus providing flexibility to assess localized concerns. For instance, a campus-specific controversy may occur, such as the controversy over Hawaiian Day at the University of South Dakota.[ The basic item format of the Core Module can easily be modified to assess the expression climate in regard to this campus-specific controversy: “Think about being at your school in a class that was discussing the controversy over HAWAIIAN DAY. How comfortable or reluctant would you feel speaking up and giving your views on this topic.” The Experience on Campus Module of the CES assesses student perceptions of how they are treated by others on campus on the basis of their sex or gender, their race or ethnicity, their religious views, their political beliefs, and their sexual orientation. Students are also asked about their perception of how different groups of students experience the classroom expression climate (e.g., LGBT students; liberal students; conservative students). This module provides a way for universities to measure student perceptions of how free students from different groups feel to share their views or express disagreement. The Viewpoint Diversity Module asks students how often their college or university encourages them to consider a wide variety of viewpoints and perspectives. Students then are asked about their perception of how diverse the ideological viewpoints are on campus among their peers, the faculty, and the administration. This module measures student perceptions of how diverse the intellectual community on campus is. Finally, a set of demographic questions make it possible to assess how diverse the respondents are — both in terms of demographics and beliefs. Heterodox Academy, in collaboration with Qualtrics, has administered the CES online to three different national samples of college students.[3] These samples were collected in June of 2018, October of 2018, and April of 2019. A number of consistent patterns are evident in these data: Roughly 70% of students report that their college or university frequently or very frequently encourages students to consider a wide variety of perspectives and viewpoints.Roughly 55% to 60% of students report that the climate on their campus prevents some people from saying things because others might find them offensive.A small percentage of students (8% to 10%) report reluctance expressing their views on a non-controversial topic.Roughly three times as many students report reluctance expressing views on controversial topics.Roughly 35% to 40% of students report they are reluctant to express their views on a controversial political issue.Reluctance expressing views on a controversial political issue is heightened among Asians, self-identified moderates and conservatives, and women. Among women, the reluctance is particularly heightened for self-identified conservatives.Roughly 25% to 30% of students report reluctance expressing views on the remaining controversial topics assessed.Among students reluctant to express their views, the primary concerns reported are about other students criticizing one’s views as offensive, and about the professor criticizing one’s views as offensive, assigning a lower grade, or declaring the views wrong. We offer these results as examples of benchmark CES data. A university that administers the CES can compare their findings to our benchmark data and see how students on their campus compare to students nationally. Such comparisons can help universities identify how they are doing relative to other institutions in fostering intellectual diversity. These comparisons can also help identify the areas where CES-administering university is falling short of its goals and needs to make concerted efforts to improve. Currently, the CES is designed to be administered to students. To fully assess the intellectual climate, it is prudent to measure the extent of that faculty self-censorship occurs in the classroom, in the research process, and in faculty meetings. We therefore intend to develop a Faculty CES, which would be populated by items relevant to the faculty experience (e.g., “Think about being in a department meeting in which colleagues were discussing the merits of MICROAGRESSION TRAINING. How comfortable or reluctant would you feel speaking up and giving your views on this topic?”). Beginning in September 2019 Heterodox Academy will partner with a select number of universities to develop additional metrics to measure the campus expression climate and determine if it is characterized by open inquiry, intellectual diversity, and constructive disagreement. At the same time, we will also develop and validate a number of applicable interventions that can be employed on campuses to foster a community characterized by open inquiry, intellectual diversity, and constructive disagreement. We would welcome the opportunity to work with faculty and administrators in the South Dakota system when developing these additional metrics and applied interventions. Sean T. Stevens Musa al-Gharbi Ilana Redstone Akresh Chris Martin Debra Mashek Harrison M. Rosenthal Jon Schaff Jonathan Haidt Note that the signatories here do not speak for the entire membership of Heterodox Academy. We did not consult the membership in drafting this statement, and we have no mechanism for expressing the collective will of our politically diverse membership. Notes [1] See e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester Cty. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 102 S. Ct. 3034, 73 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1982); Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273, 108 S.Ct. 562, 98 L.Ed.2d 592 (1988) (noting the “oft-expressed view that the education of the Nation’s youth is primarily the responsibility of parents, teachers, and state and local school officials, and not of federal judges”); Healy, 408 U.S., at 180, 92 S.Ct. 2338; and Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733 (1969). [2] David Christian Legal Soc. Chapter of the Univ. of California, Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2976, 177 L. Ed. 2d 838 (2010). [3] Heterodox Academy’s Campus Expression Survey has been administered to a national non-probability student panel three times. The Summer 2018 sample was collected between July 10 and July 16, 2018. A total of 873 college students were surveyed, 759 were enrolled at 4 year-colleges and universities. The remaining students were enrolled either at a community college (N = 76) or a for-profit college or university (N = 38). Data from the full sample is presented. The Fall 2018 sample was collected between October 8 and November 2, 2018. A total pf 1,347 college students were surveyed. All students surveyed were enrolled at a 4-year college or university. The Spring 2019 sample was collected between March 27 and May 9, 2019. A total of 1,357 college students were surveyed. All students surveyed were enrolled at a 4-year college or university. Because of the time frame, we compared students who were surveyed during final exam period (N = 27) to those not surveyed during final exam period (N = 1,330). Differences were minimal so data for all 1,357 respondents are presented. In all samples, data are weighted by census region, gender, and race/ ethnicity.... Read more...

Heterodox Academy

Why is HxA Necessary?

What Does HxA Do?

Key Tools & Resources:

LATEST BLOG POSTS

The Value of Heterodoxy in the Academy

“The whole educational process will be enriched and enlivened by a multiplicity of voices and perspectives.“
–Nadine Strossen

We welcome applications from academics, graduate students, and others.

Heterodox Academy

Why is HxA Necessary?

What Does HxA Do?

Key Tools & Resources:

LATEST BLOG POSTS

The Value of Heterodoxy in the Academy

“The whole educational process will be enriched and enlivened by a multiplicity of voices and perspectives.“ –Nadine Strossen

We welcome applications from academics, graduate students, and others.

“The whole educational process will be enriched and enlivened by a multiplicity of voices and perspectives.“
–Nadine Strossen