Welcome to Heterodox Academy - Heterodox Academy

Why is HxA Necessary?

In order to address society’s most intractable problems, learners must weave together the best ideas from a range of perspectives.

In many fields, scholars’ backgrounds and commitments are insufficiently diverse. As a result, important questions and ideas may go unexplored, key assumptions can go unchallenged, and the natural human tendencies towards motivated reasoning, confirmation bias, and tribalism can go unchecked. This undermines research quality and the impartiality of peer review; it can also corrupt committee decisions about admissions, hiring, promotion, and curriculum design. Simultaneously, institutional policies, procedures and incentive models of colleges and universities are changing. The needs, priorities and expectations among new cohorts of students are evolving — even as the political climate in the United States (and beyond) has grown increasingly polarized and toxic. The result is a highly-combustible campus environment. Professors and students alike describe the toll self-censoring and the ever-present threat of social or bureaucratic censure have taken on learning, discovery, and growth.

These problems have not gone unnoticed by lawmakers, the media, or the general public. Many fields and institutions where these trends are most pronounced have faced declining enrollments and budget cuts. Meanwhile, trust in universities, expertise, and scientific research has eroded — reducing the impact and continued viability of many lines of inquiry.

What Does HxA Do?

As a collaborative of academic insiders, we are deeply committed to the continued flourishing of colleges and universities — and deeply concerned about the current state of affairs, which is not sustainable. We aspire to help chart a different path forward by:

Increasing public awareness of these issues, to spur action among faculty, staff, students, alumni and donors;
Conducting, disseminating and facilitating research to better understand the nature of the challenges facing institutions of higher learning — and how they can be effectively addressed;
Developing tools and resources that professors, administrators, and others can deploy to assess and then improve their own pedagogical, disciplinary and broader campus cultures;
Cultivating communities of practice among teachers, researchers, and administrators to help accelerate the process of reform; and
Identifying and celebrating institutions that make progress on these matters.

Key Tools & Resources:

A self-report tool you can use to assess which students are feeling intimidated to speak up about which topics and why.

An interactive, psychology-based platform designed to depolarize campuses and foster mutual understanding across differences.

LATEST BLOG POSTS

frontpage

- Measuring Academic Freedom and Intellectual Diversity
  Whenever a university claims commitment to academic excellence, critical thinking, research productivity, career preparation, innovation, diversity and inclusion or academic freedom, there is a legitimate question about whether these terms are just fashionable slogans or actual campus characteristics. Definitions and measurement are key. Reliable and relevant data are necessary. For example, if a university claimed devotion to academic excellence, but only had data showing selectivity in admissions, one might have reason to be skeptical about whether the education it actually provided was excellent. In a similar vein, almost all universities claim to honor academic freedom. After President Trump, without much staff preparation, threatened that federal research funding might be cut off for campuses that violated free speech, a joint letter signed by 12 organizations argued that all higher educational institutions are committed to academic freedom, so there was no need for further federal scrutiny which might endanger institutional autonomy. This blanket affirmation ignored widely publicized incidences of campus speech disruptions and disinvitations, the creation of safe spaces, trigger warning policies, bias response teams, and several national surveys showing students worried that they could not speak freely. Obviously the scope and vigor of academic freedom varies by campus. So how can these characteristics be measured and what is their relationship to intellectual diversity? On public campuses, constitutional speech and due process requirements must be followed regardless of the preferences of local administrators. The Supreme Court has declared: To impose any straight jacket upon intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our nation. No field of education is so thoroughly comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be made. That is particularly true in the social sciences where few, if any principles are accepted as absolute. Keyishian v, Board of Regents, 385 U.S.589, 1967 or Yet the precedents of this Court leave no room for the view that, because of the acknowledged need for order, First Amendment protections should apply with less force on college campuses than in the community at large. Quite the contrary. The college classroom, with its surrounding environs, is peculiarly the “marketplace of ideas,’” and we break no new constitutional ground in affirming the Nation’s dedication to safeguarding academic freedom.” (emphasis in the original) Healy v. James, 408 U.S.169,180 1972 or The quality and creative power of student intellectual life to this day remain a measure of a school’s influence and attainment. For the University [of Virginia], by its regulations to cast disapproval on particular viewpoints of its students risks the suppression of free speech and creative inquiry in one of the vital centers of the Nation’s intellectual life, its college and university campuses. Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819,836, 1995 Finally, the Ninth Circuit unanimously agreed in a 2010 case where a faculty member was sanctioned for arguably demeaning Hispanics: The Constitution embraces such a heated exchange of views, even (perhaps especially) when they concern sensitive topics like race, where the risk of conflict and insult is high. Without the right to stand against society’s most strongly-held convictions, the marketplace of ideas would decline into a boutique of the banal, as the urge to censor is greatest where debate is most unquieting and orthodoxy is most entrenched. The right to provoke, offend and shock lies at the core of the First Amendment.This is particularly so on college campuses. Intellectual advancement has traditionally progressed though discord and dissent, as a diversity of views ensures that ideas survive because they are correct, not because they are popular. Colleges and universities—sheltered from currents of popular opinion by tradition, geography, tenure and monetary endowments –have historically fostered that exchange. But that role in our society will not survive, if certain points of view may be declared beyond the pale. Rodriquez v. Maricopa County Community College District, 605 F.3d 703, 9th Circuit, 2010 It is hard to reconcile these judicial declarations with the approval by university counsels and Vice Presidents of various speech codes which forbid students from making any statements perceived as discriminatory by members of a wide variety of groups. When the new organization Speech First challenged bias response teams tasked with enforcing these codes in 2018, the University of Michigan changed many of its bias response definitions and policies “to ensure their consistency with principles of free speech.” The University of Texas had administrative rules that speech should be reported, if perceived as “offensive, insulting, insensitive, or derogatory” and occurring “in the classroom, on social media, at a party or student organization event.” After another Speech First lawsuit, UT avoided judicial sanction by confessing that its bias response team never actually punished students. Apparently, creating a chilling effect was purpose enough for circumscribing student speech on subjects available to all other American citizens. Increasingly, academic freedom and due process are values that must be followed by “private institutions.” In 2018, John McAdams, a Marquette University political scientist, won a landmark academic freedom case in the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Bolstered by briefs from the National Association of Scholars and the American Association of University Professors et al., the Court found that, although a private Jesuit university, Marquette’s formal statements about academic freedom created a contractual obligation to respect McAdams’ comments about academic matters. Similarly, federal courts are finding that even private universities are obligated to respect due process in adjudicating Title IX complaints. Yet, even if schools are legally obligated to defend free speech and due process, important questions remain regarding definitions (Who is covered? Under what circumstances?) and how academic freedom would be measured or evaluated at a given institution. For example: Where would a person go to find an operational definition of academic freedom on a campus? Is the academic freedom language just rusting away in some obscure paragraph in the faculty handbook, almost never mentioned in administrative speeches or campus publications? Is there any usable history of the campus treatment of academic freedom controversies that have emerged to guide those with dissenting views and future adjudicators? Campuses have specific officers responsible for research integrity, investigating Title IX claims, enhancing diversity, and determining athletic eligibility. Who is responsible for protecting academic freedom?Are students clearly included in academic freedom affirmations — and, if so, does the policy cover admissions criteria, scholarship, research, and internship decisions? Or does the campus or its units prioritize students who are committed to complex concepts as global citizenship, community engagement or social justice over students with more traditional values? If the campus has a policy of diversity and inclusion, as so many do now, what is the definition of diversity beyond racial, ethnic and sexual identifiers? Or does academic freedom also require a commitment to intellectual diversity? If a department has faculty with a single ideological orientation can academic freedom flourish? Do course syllabi and professorial instructions discuss the value of civility and intellectual diversity? Does the campus have policy of inviting speakers and hosting debates reflecting a variety of viewpoints? If measurement is the key, then the surveys by Brookings and CATO which show many students are reluctant to express their opinions in class or among peers are important indicators. Unless individual campuses, however, as the Heterodox Academy urges, conduct such surveys and make the outcomes available for public discussion, invigorating the values of academic freedom and intellectual diversity will be difficult. George R. La Noue is Research Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at the University of Maryland Baltimore County. He taught constitutional law for five decades and is the author of a new book, Silenced Stages: The Loss of Academic Freedom and Campus Policy Debates. As an organization that prizes pluralism and disagreement — with more than 2,500 members holding diverse views on most issues — Heterodox Academy almost never takes positions as an organization on current events and controversies. Opinions expressed here are those of the author(s). Publication does not imply endorsement by Heterodox Academy or any of its members. We encourage readers to follow us on Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn — and to join in the conversation on those forums — to weigh in on this or other posts.... Read more...
- Applying the Theory of Affective Intelligence to Support for Authoritarian Policies and Parties
  The idea that fear drives right-wing political attitudes and support for right-wing politicians has largely become accepted as a truism among many scholars (e.g., Altemeyer 1996; Jost et al. 2003; 2017; Robin 2004; Wilson 1973) and pundits (e.g., here, here, here). New research, published in Advances in Political Psychology, suggests that this model of conservatism may be misspecified. Marcus et al. (2019) contend that much of the foundational scholarship on the psychology of conservatism has postulated that a perceived threat triggers a singular emotional response: fear. This postulation is at odds with findings from neuropsychology and neuroscience suggesting that the brain makes multiple affective appraisals of the environment. These distinct emotional states are often experienced simultaneously and can precede cognitive appraisals (Adolphs 2008; Zajonc 1980; 1984). Hence, in contrast to this well-established model of conservatism, affective intelligence theory (AIT; see Marcus, Neuman & MacKuen 2000) proposes that multiple affective appraisals of a stimulus or situation enable two approaches to judgment in the political domain — for liberals and conservatives alike. The first default approach leads to partisan reliance on habituated practices and traditions. The second represents a departure from the default and produces nonpartisan deliberation by setting aside traditions and heuristic-based thinking. The result is more careful deliberation and increased openness to novel solutions. Importantly, AIT contends that the experience of anger is concerned with noxious threats and will produce default reasoning and a reliance on habit and tradition. Fear, on the other hand, should lead to a departure from the default mode resulting in a wide-ranging search for novel information and an openness to new possibilities. Thus, increased authoritarianism in response to threat should depend on whether the threatening stimulus (or stimuli) generate anger, not fear. In three studies, Marcus et al. tested — and found support for — this theory. Hypotheses For all 3 studies Marcus et al. (2019, p. 119) specified two hypotheses: Anger serves to launch defenses against challenges to extant core norms by those who threaten them. Given the importance of those norms, people will often disregard the specific benefits or costs of the actions deployed to defend them (i.e. utility, in the language of classic economic theory). Anger will be most potent among those who are most attached to those core norms.Fear will lead people to disregard extant practices (practices that will likely be ill-suited for novel circumstances). Anxious people will thus be able to turn away from the habits and assumptions they would otherwise rely on — and concern themselves with securing the best possible outcome. Methodology Study 1 examined how the emotions of anger and fear differentially mobilized right-wing voters in the 2014 European parliamentary election in France — using data from the Making Electoral Democracy Work survey conducted in two different regions in France. This survey generated a diverse and representative set of responses on a variety of demographic factors. Respondents reported their vote choice. They also responded to two 5-point Likert scale items — one item assessed fear, the other, anger. Both employed a “not at all…” to “quite …” scale. Probability of voting for the Front National party, France’s far-right party, served as the dependent variable. Study 2 was conducted shortly after the Charlie Hedbo attacks in January of 2015. Marcus et al. were able to embed a measure of authoritarianism in the CEVIPOF barometer of political confidence (for more details see, Vasilopoulos et al. 2018). Fear and anger were also assessed. A total of 1,524 respondents were surveyed in two waves. The first wave was conducted before the Charlie Hedbo attacks, the second wave was conducted three weeks after the attacks. The adoption or rejection of authoritarian policies served as the dependent variable. Study 3 employed data obtained from the first two waves of the French Election Study, which conducted a panel roughly every month between November 2015 and the June 2017 legislative elections. Wave 1 was conducted from November 20 to November 29, 2015. Wave 2 was conducted form January 22 to February 3, 2016. A total of 20,460 respondents participated in both waves. Vote choice in the first round of elections served as the dependent variable and was measured during wave 2. In Study 3, all of the independent variables were measured during wave 1. Fear and anger were measured by asking respondents the extent to which they felt certain emotions, on a 10-point Likert scale ranging from “not at all” to “extremely,” when reflecting on the November 13, 2015 terrorist attacks in France. Fear was measured with three emotional terms (e.g., anxious) and anger was measured with four (e.g., resentment). Authoritarianism was measured using Feldman and Stenner’s (1997) child-rearing attitudes scale. Results As can be seen below (Figure 1) in Study 1, when French citizens moved from lower to higher levels of fear those on the center-right and the left were more likely to vote for Front National, although the shifts were not statistically significant. Yet, as anger increased among French citizens so did the probability of those on the far-right voting for Front National. Figure 1: The effects of fear and voting on ideological identification and the vote for the Front National, 2014 Source: Making Electoral Democracy Work project (MEDW; see Figure 3, Marcus et al. 2019, p. 122). In Study 2, which took place shortly after the Charlie Hedbo terrorist attacks, the French reported being fearful and angry, although they reported higher levels of anger. Increased levels of fear increased the probability that those on the left supported authoritarian policies. In contrast, as anger increased, support for authoritarianism was evident among those on the right. As can be seen below (Figure 2), in Study 3 both hypotheses were supported. Fear (left-hand panel) reduced voting for the National Front among those on the center-right, and even more so among those on the far-right. Anger (right-hand panel), in contrast increased support for the National Front, in particular among those on the far-right. The same pattern emerged for authoritarian attitudes. Figure 2: Indirect effects of fear and anger on left-right predispositions and voting for Front National (top) and authoritarianism and voting for Front National (bottom). Source: Figures 7 and 8, Marcus et al. 2019, p. 127). Conclusions Marcus et al. (2019) concluded that the pattern of results obtained in these data suggest that it is anger in response to a noxious threat that drives those predisposed to adopt conservative and far-right attitudes to do so. Contrary to the well-established model associating fear and conservatism, in Studies 1 and 2 fear had no effect on endorsement of authoritarian attitudes and the probability of voting for Front National, among those on the center-right or far-right. In Study 3, fear reduced the endorsement of authoritarian attitudes and the probability of voting for Front National, among those on the center-right or far-right. Thus, the well-established model linking fear and conservatism may be misspecified. This misspecification could have profound implications. By treating threat and fear as equivalent discourse, politicians, journalists, pundits, and scholars ignore and obscure the role anger plays in politics. Attempts to address those who are politically angry via a false understanding that they are not angry but fearful — this is likely to further exacerbate their anger. Furthermore, policy proposals that attempt to address fears are not likely to be viewed as effective because many voters may not be fearful, but are instead angry. Indeed, as Marcus et al. (2019, p. 131) noted: “But conventional wisdom here, as it often does elsewhere, keeps us blind to that which lies outside its vision of fear as the essential and singular cause of our discontent. Anger has long been apparent in the reactions to various progressive projects, such as continued population movement from rural areas to urban, increasing cosmopolitan patterns (cultural exchange, interest in style, fashion and celebrity, as well as trade, travel, and so on), acceptance of previously disparaged groups (such as single women, women in the workplace, gay marriage, atheists and more). ” Later, Marcus et al. (2019, p. 131) contend that “a political order that cannot address competing claims of angry groups will be more vulnerable to leaders proposing authoritarian governance. This will be especially so for any regime that does not accurately recognize the angry forces at play.” Why Are These Findings Important? Global concerns over rising illiberalism and increased support for authoritarian leaders and policies is growing (see e.g., here, here, here, and here). Many scholars and pundits however appear to have adopted a narrow lens through which they are interpreting these events. Attempts to assuage fears over shifting demographics and cultural values appear likely to exacerbate the anger these shifts are likely producing. The exacerbation of anger may further polarize political parties and voters. It may also lead people to see the political order in a society as ineffectual, possibly in a state of disarray. Anger might then lead to a movement to oust the ineffectual elites from power, likely in favor of a demagogue who promises strong leadership and clear solutions. More narrowly, these results are the latest in a quickly growing body of literature (e.g., Brandt et al. 2014; Conway et al. 2016; Malka, Lelkes & Holzer 2018; Malka et al. 2014) in political psychology that challenges the foundations of the well-established ‘rigidity of the right’ model linking fear in response to perceived threat to political conservatism. The present findings therefore help broaden our understanding of the psychological underpinnings of political ideology and political behavior — and should prompt research further delineating the different responses that fear and anger, once evoked, can prompt in the political domain. Reference: Marcus, George et al. (2019). “Applying the theory of affective intelligence to support for authoritarian policies and parties.” Advances in Political Psychology 40 (S1): 109-39. Sean Stevens is Heterodox Academy’s Research Director. He has a PhD in social psychology from Rutgers University. As an organization that prizes pluralism and disagreement — with more than 2,500 members holding diverse views on most issues — Heterodox Academy almost never takes positions as an organization on current events and controversies. Opinions expressed here are those of the author(s). Publication does not imply endorsement by Heterodox Academy or any of its members. We encourage readers to follow us on Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn — and to join in the conversation on those forums — to weigh in on this or other posts.... Read more...

Heterodox Academy

Why is HxA Necessary?

What Does HxA Do?

Key Tools & Resources:

LATEST BLOG POSTS

The Value of Heterodoxy in the Academy

“The whole educational process will be enriched and enlivened by a multiplicity of voices and perspectives.“
–Nadine Strossen

We welcome applications from academics, graduate students, and others.

Heterodox Academy

Why is HxA Necessary?

What Does HxA Do?

Key Tools & Resources:

LATEST BLOG POSTS

The Value of Heterodoxy in the Academy

“The whole educational process will be enriched and enlivened by a multiplicity of voices and perspectives.“ –Nadine Strossen

We welcome applications from academics, graduate students, and others.

“The whole educational process will be enriched and enlivened by a multiplicity of voices and perspectives.“
–Nadine Strossen